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In an inspiring critique of ‘flexibility’, Anna Pollert (1991) pointed both to the ideological 
aspect of the concept of flexibility as it was voiced by proponents of industrial restructuring 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, and to its force as a reality performing the transformation of 
relations in the labour market and in the labour process. She also underlined how the 
argument of change that dominated the flexibility debate often presented the saliency of new 
flexible organizational, work and labour-market arrangements against the background of a 
particularly simplistic characterization of the past (that is, Fordism), where these types of 
relations were deemed to be absent. In this chapter I want to engage with this critique by 
trying to address ‘flexible capitalism’ not as something ‘new’ but as a persistent aspect of 
capitalism that acquires different expressions depending on history and place. Moreover, I 
will try to show how concepts that become part of a particular structure of the social 
reproduction of capitalism, and give form to a dominant moral economy at a particular 
moment and place, have to be articulated to the material transformations of relationships of 
exploitation and domination that structure the political economy of that time and place (see 
also Neveling, this volume). From this perspective, the alienable aspect of labour power in 
capitalism is always dependent on its inalienable ties to a social environment that constitutes 
its specificity (Narotzky 2009; see also Garsten, Knox, this volume). 
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This chapter is based on two ethnographic experiences in Spain, the first in a farming 
area of rural Catalonia (where I undertook research from 1986 to 1988), the second one in a 
regional economy in the south of the autonomous community of Valencia (where I carried 
out research in 1995/6 with Gavin Smith). A historical perspective, central to both analyses, 
has enabled a better understanding of historical transformation, particularly in relation to 
changes in production relations and to related emergent conflicts. By comparing these two 
instances, I wish to underscore the productive tension between two apparently distinct 
domains of social and moral obligation: that of personal and intimate relations (in the home, 
among friends and kin), and that of production relations (clearly linked to a market logic). 
Although in both cases a similar entanglement of values pertaining to different realms occurs, 
the degree and manner in which this situation seems to become structural to capital 
accumulation differs. I will propose that we need different categories from those that have 
characterized the social sciences since the rise of modernity. Instead of discrete, differentiated 
abstractions often opposed in pairs, we need methodological instruments that allow for 
pervasive ambiguity in order to understand present-day processes of value production, 
circulation and accumulation. Instead of an evolutionary understanding of temporality, we 
need historical complexity devoid of any form of teleology. 
The general theoretical argument I want to make is about a shift away from distinct 
confronted realms of value creation, material production and social organization 
(reproduction/production; emotional/rational; non-capitalist/capitalist) that would be 
dialectically intertwined or ‘articulated’. I suggest we think instead in terms of an ambivalent 
value realm, predicated on the ambiguity of simultaneously experiencing these domains of 
social interaction. This value realm allows agents greater flexibility and opportunism, and a 
wider scope for reconfiguring relations according to tactical needs. It is also highly arbitrary, 
and morally shifting and contradictory.  
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By using both the framework of ‘moral economy’ and that of ‘political economy’ in 
approaching the ethnographic cases, I intend to point to the ambiguous logic that sustains 
economic practice. Thus my contention is that this overlapping of realms of value enables a 
particular form of exploitation by capitalist firms and a particular mode of governmentality 
that continuously shifts and blurs conflict locations and obscures knowledge about the 
localized and globalized processes of capital accumulation. 
 
A>Moral Economy and Political Economy 
In present-day anthropology, moral economy is making a strong comeback in the conceptual 
arena, with analyses stressing the centrality of moral values, practices and emotions in 
channelling economic and political behaviour.1 Scott’s argument for reconfiguring ‘moral 
economy’ as a central concept for understanding the emergence or lack of peasant rebellion 
was strongly based on a critique of Marxist political economy’s idea of exploitation (Scott 
1976). Scott criticized the abstract universal aspect of the concept of exploitation that 
produced a measurable value (surplus value), itself a result of relations of production based 
on forced cooperation (expressed in terms of contract and exchange) between owners of the 
means of production (capital) and a workforce (labour) lacking the means of livelihood. From 
the perspective of a Marxist critical approach to political economy, then, this situation would 
account for inevitable class conflict, unless ideology obscured this reality with the veil of 
false consciousness. What Scott (and before him E.P. Thompson and Moore) underscored 
was the historical and place-bound specificity of social relations in actually existing social 
formations on the one hand, and the centrality of diverse modes of obligation that sustained 
the structure of social reproduction in a particular place and time on the other. What was 
especially interesting in Scott’s view was his insistence that the social and cultural framework 
of subjective experience and obligation was not an ideology producing false consciousness. It 
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was instead a concrete reality, the only reality, and had to be explained in its own terms. He 
then produced the two moral principles of ‘securing subsistence’ and ‘claiming reciprocity’ 
as the basis of his moral economy concept, in turn making it a universal explanatory tool for 
understanding conflict.  
However, this did not explain why social relations of production changed in such a 
way that a disjuncture appeared between the existing moral economy framework of 
expectations and the new practices of landowners and middlemen, which did not follow 
traditional forms of behaviour and then triggered rebellion. In sum, it did not explain the 
logic of the economic transformations that led to exploiters going against the grain of moral 
economy practices. In order to understand these, a Marxist political economy framework was 
still much more useful. Here, the logic of transformation was based on an abstract objective 
law: capital accumulation, a particular form of increasing wealth production and 
appropriation through exchange. The finality of capital accumulation seemed to constrain 
equally, although in different and unequal ways, both the owners of capital and the owners of 
labour power. This objective structured production physically, spatially and ideologically. 
Workplace and home were increasingly separated and gendered: producing goods and 
obtaining an income became commoditized and contractual, while housework and caring for 
kin and dependents was defined as emotional and natural activities. The realm of 
commoditized value was disconnected from that of non-commoditized values. Ideologically, 
if not always in practice, industrial capitalism established clearly defined and opposed realms 
of life: the private domain of household reproduction, with its internal hierarchies and power 
differentials; and the domain of commodity production, public in its aim of providing an 
optimal allocation of resources, although private in its authority structure. This narrative was 
couched in a teleological time frame, but was often disproved in the here and now by the 
many expressions of capitalist accumulation that did not conform to it. Indeed, a number of 
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conceptual instruments were produced in order to explain the pervasiveness of instances 
where capitalist exploitation hinged on the blurring of commoditized and non-commoditized 
relationships of exchange.2 
In theory, the need remained to bridge the abstract dimension of the economic 
structure developed through the logic of accumulation and the concrete dimension of the 
practical processes that enabled its continuity in real life situations (political institutions, 
culture and so on). This dilemma has produced some of Marxism’s most interesting recent 
contributions to political economy. While the abstraction of a logic of accumulation has 
proved very useful in explaining historical transformations through the production of a theory 
of the laws of motion of capitalism, in order to connect this general movement with concrete 
historical locations other concrete, on-the-ground institutions and practices have to be 
considered.  
Here Gramsci’s stress on the power of reflexive culture to produce the tools for 
transforming the ‘good sense’ of concrete historical experience into a ‘historical bloc’3 
capable of confronting hegemony expresses the need to resolve the tension between abstract 
and concrete movements (Gramsci 1987). In his definition of a ‘philosophy of praxis’, the 
general problem that Gramsci tries to address is how to produce a coherent conception of the 
world that empowers subaltern classes as agents of history. This is also set as a necessary 
superseding of a mechanical determinism that would fatalistically reproduce subaltern 
positions in a particular structure. To underscore the activity of the will present within 
subaltern classes was in itself a political act: ‘if yesterday the subaltern element was a thing, 
today it is no longer a thing but an historical person, a protagonist; … an agent, necessarily 
active and taking the initiative’ (ibid.: 337). For Gramsci (ibid.: 323–77), the forces defining 
the arena of struggle are: first, a particular structure of the economic and social forces that 
constitutes the environment of people’s practical activity and produces in them, through that 
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practice, a latent conception of the world; second, a ‘philosophy’ becoming the norm of 
collective action for a historical epoch which expresses ‘nothing other than the “history” of 
that epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of variations that the leading group has 
succeeded in imposing on preceding reality’ (ibid.: 345); and third, a ‘creative philosophy’ 
critically emergent from practical activity and corresponding to the objective historical 
necessities of ordinary people (‘the many’) (ibid.: 345–46). This creative philosophy’s 
strength is predicated on its ‘rationality’, on its correspondence with ‘objective historical 
necessity’, which makes it acceptable to the many:  
EXT> 
It comes to be accepted by the many, and accepted permanently: that is, by becoming 
a culture, a form of ‘good sense’, a conception of the world with an ethic that 
conforms to its structure … [It is] diffused in such a way as to convert itself into an 
active norm of conduct. Creative, therefore, should be understood … as thought 
which modifies the way of feeling of the many and consequently reality itself, which 
cannot be thought without this many. Creative also in the sense that it teaches that 
reality does not exist on its own, in and for itself, but only in a historical relationship 
with the men who modify it, etc. (ibid.: 346) 
<EXT 
As a consequence of this insight, Marxist social scientists found a way to articulate scale, 
thereby encompassing intimate experience in relation to institutional transformations and 
structural movements. Raymond Williams (1977) spoke of ‘structures of feeling’ in order to 
capture the tension of emerging understandings tied to immediate experience that were 
simultaneously structured at intimate and institutional scales. Bourdieu (1980a) developed the 
concept of ‘habitus’ while trying to resolve a similar breach between structure and concrete 
practice. Anthropologists in particular (e.g. Wolf 1982; Roseberry 1989, 1994; Roseberry and 
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O’Brien 1991; Smith 1999, 2004) were able to underscore the agency of concrete subaltern 
positions within hegemonic frameworks.  
While all of these approaches were trying to make sense of the tension between 
abstract and concrete realities simultaneously reproduced at different scales, the moral 
economy/political economy divide was set in a historical-evolutionary framework that 
entailed a particular teleology. As it appears in Thompson (1971) initially, and later in Scott 
(1976, 1985), the moral economy is captured in the historical process of its demise, when its 
breach by the powerful classes causes the subaltern to revolt, demanding the return of a status 
quo ante that provided relative security in times of crisis (see also Hobsbawm 1965). The 
moral economy, then, as a historical reality and as an analytical concept, is construed in 
opposition to classical political economy (also as both a description of historical reality and 
as a concept). It is defined as a situation where moral obligation (forms of social and political 
dependencies), rather than contractual obligation (individual autonomy to engage in a 
commitment freely), set the framework for the transfer of resources and structure the 
economy (including surplus extraction) (see also Neveling, this volume). 
This dichotomous and evolutionist view has been challenged by various scholars, 
starting with Thompson himself pointing to a methodological problem (Thompson 1993; see 
also Zelizer 1988; Booth 1994), one which has been mostly resolved by granting an abstract 
status to the analytical concept and detaching it from its original concrete historical basis, 
enabling it to float freely as an intellectual commodity. Instead, in my opinion, we need to 
preserve the tension between the various scales of analysis that are in fact simultaneously 
experienced by actual historical subjects, and which emerge more clearly in moments of 
rupture. These moments underscore a mismatch between the processes of surplus extraction 
and the moral frameworks of obligation that sustained the continuity of particular forms of 
Narotzky | 246 
production and unequal distribution. Moreover, we need to keep the tension between abstract 
and concrete realities in our analysis instead of choosing one or the other.4  
Therefore, I want to point to the key articulation between the concrete historical 
manifestation of the moral economy on the one hand, and the concrete historical 
manifestation of processes of so called ‘primitive accumulation’ on the other. Both in 
Thompson’s (and Scott’s) original analysis, what causes the revolt of peasants is tied to the 
emergence of a new hegemony that, while eroding some types of paternalistic reciprocal 
obligations, supports a different set of obligations – mostly between an incipient bourgeoisie 
and power elites – which become central to the development of capitalism. For Thompson, 
‘The “nature of things” which had once made imperative, in times of dearth, at least some 
symbolic solidarity between the rulers and the poor, now dictated solidarity between the 
rulers and “the Employment of Capital”’ (Thompson 1971: 131). Moreover: 
EXT> 
The breakthrough of the new political economy of the free market was also the 
breakdown of the old moral economy of provision … One symptom of its final 
demise is that we have been able to accept for so long an abbreviated and 
‘economistic’ picture of the food riot, as a direct, spasmodic, irrational response to 
hunger, a picture which is itself a product of a political economy which diminished 
human reciprocities to the wages-nexus. (ibid.: 136) 
<EXT 
It has been cogently argued by other scholars (Perelman 2000) that the intellectual 
construction of the corpus of classical political economy was a central aspect in the 
production of particular institutional frameworks that supported capitalist development. 
Likewise, various paternalistic institutions and practices of Ancien Régime moral economy in 
pre-capitalist Europe were supported by a corpus of discourses, mostly but not only religious 
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ones, which never completely disappeared (Clavero 1990; Hespanha 1993; Guerreau-Jalabert 
2000).  
The analytical concept of ‘moral economy’, therefore, cannot be separated from its 
concrete emergence as the expression of a clash of material forces and cultural constructs 
vying for hegemony at a particular historical conjuncture of primitive accumulation. It is 
interesting to note, moreover, that the present-day resurgence of the ‘moral economy’ 
discourse parallels what some scholars have underscored as a new primitive accumulation 
process (De Angelis 2007), the persisting relevance of processes akin to primitive 
accumulation such as accumulation by dispossession being recognized as central to 
capitalism (Harvey 2005). Therefore the ‘moral’ aspect emerges with force again in the 
concrete conjuncture of the neoliberal expression of present-day capitalism which seems to 
have shattered a certain moral arrangement of capitalism based, first, on relatively Keynesian 
distribution of wealth policies, and, second, on the belief that the process sustained by the 
capitalist objective of expanded accumulation was part of a process of political ‘democratic’ 
inclusion and relative social ‘convergence’ (Smith 2011). The framework of capitalist 
morality was supported by the enlightenment liberal project of equality and freedom for all.  
The perspective I will use in this article is one that attempts to understand moral 
aspects of economies as integral to political economy processes and to the drive to expand 
capital accumulation, a methodology close to Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis. 
In particular, what seems to emerge from the two ethnographic cases I present is a 
situation where moral obligation is an asset for capital accumulation. It is also a situation 
where ‘embeddedness’ and ‘reciprocity’ are central to the operation of capitalist social 
relations of production (see also Cross, this volume). In these two cases, we observe a 
growing tension between two apparently contradictory processes. On the one hand, the 
technical aspects of productivity and competition focus on enhancing skills through endless 
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training and obtaining a flexible labour market through the elimination of legal or 
institutional protection. This is viewed as the necessary liberalization of the labour market, 
and produces a particular moral environment where responsibility is shifted to the 
entrepreneurial self of the worker. Flexible capitalism is about enhancing the individual 
qualities of the worker (adaptable skills for flexible organization) and fully disembedding the 
labour market from society as expressed by state regulations. On the other hand, requirements 
of trustworthiness and good character are simultaneously at work in the labour market, 
relying on embedded social networks or patronage links (see also Garsten, this volume). 
These are integral to work relations and employment opportunities, and are the other face of 
flexible capitalism.  
The classical concept of ‘reciprocity’ as developed in anthropology presents an 
interesting inroad into the observed practices of embeddedness in capitalism. I will explore 
this avenue in order to underscore two issues that have emerged from my ethnographic 
experience: first, ambivalence in subjects’ evaluation of responsibilities, and, second, anxiety 
in assessing and judging appropriate moral behaviour. The concept of ‘reciprocity’, stressing 
the social value of exchange relations, will be contrasted to that of ‘social capital’, stressing 
the exchange value of social relations. These two concepts appear as the mirror image of each 
other, and stress different aspects of real life experiences that blur various value domains. 
After a brief review of the concepts of ‘social capital’ and ‘reciprocity’, I will present 
these issues as they appear in the ethnographies of my two different field sites in Spain. Here, 
the anxiety caused by the clash or the blurring of boundaries of different value regimes 
(structures of obligation) becomes apparent. Historical specificities add nuances to the 
modalities of tension, however. It seems to me that both the generality of the tensions arising 
from ambivalent responsibilities and the specificity of their localized expression need to be 
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understood as active principles of capitalism’s social reproduction in different historical 
conjunctures. 
 
A>Two Concepts: Social Capital and Reciprocity 
The concept of ‘social capital’ as defined by Bourdieu (1980b) originally refers to one of the 
various fields (champs) of capital: economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Capital is here 
understood as a social relation, a social energy that can be put to play and accumulated in 
different fields by social actors constrained by their habitus but free to strategize. Each field 
has a specific logic to it that determines the incorporated and ‘objectified’ capital resources to 
be used efficiently in each field’s ‘market’ (Bourdieu 1988: 112–13). The concept of social 
capital, here, seeks to explain the specific logic of the social field and its articulation with the 
system of social reproduction. It highlights how certain forms of sociability are knowingly 
used and produced as long lasting, non-contractual mutual obligations. 5 As such, they create 
a particular sense of belonging to a group that will recurrently provide access to valuable 
resources (material, symbolic). These in turn will be articulated to other forms of capital, 
within a general logic of accumulation specific to each field. Although it appears as an 
abstract concept of universal applicability, social capital in Bourdieu is tied to a concrete 
economic system, namely capitalism, and its social reproduction (Bourdieu 1980b, 1988). 
Bourdieu’s methodology is linked to his critique of capitalism. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s 
work is partially guilty of the extension of capital as a metaphor to all fields of social 
interaction, creating the potentiality for the misappropriation of the concept of social capital 
that subsequently took place. 
The concept of social capital that has become hegemonic in the social sciences is 
based on the premises of rational action theory – a theory that was explicitly rejected by 
Bourdieu (see Wacquant 1989: 42–43). Coleman’s social capital concept seeks to reintroduce 
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‘social context’ in rational action, premised on the autonomous individual and freedom of 
choice. Indeed, he asserts, ‘the conception of social capital as a resource for action is one way 
of introducing social structure into the rational action paradigm’ (Coleman 1988: S95) 
Following this trend, social theorists have developed a concept of social capital attuned to a 
new development paradigm, one where community relations and values are used as 
productive ‘capital’ to forward economic development.6  
Finally, the work of Putnam (1993) is key to the articulation of an instrument of 
economic development – social capital – with the development of civic political 
responsibility, in a new governance agenda. For Putnam, the kernel of the concept expresses 
two elements: ‘norms of reciprocity’ and ‘networks of civic participation’ (ibid.: 167). Here, 
‘social capital refers to those aspects of social organization such as trust, norms and networks 
that might improve the efficiency of society through enabling coordinate action’ (ibid.: 167). 
Putnam’s work has been strongly criticized, and I will not go over the extensive literature 
here (see e.g. Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes and Landolt 1996;  Tarrow 1996; 
Newton 1997; Putzel 1997). However, it is important to note that in this political project the 
state is to be substituted by social capital as the main regulatory instrument.7 From this 
perspective, the concept appears as part of a neoliberal governance agenda. Indeed, social 
capital as an instrument of power points, firstly, to instances where moral obligation 
(‘reciprocity’) substitutes for the legal or contractual obligation sanctioned by the state as a 
guarantor, and, secondly, to instances where unelected private networks of individuals 
(‘networks of civic participation’) set the objectives of the ‘common good’ and exercise 
control over their implementation.8 
Ben Fine (2001) presents a devastating critique of the concept of social capital and of 
the use international agencies such as the World Bank have made of it in their post-
Washington Consensus development policies. His main critique, from a political economy 
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point of view, is that the concept rests on a previous conceptual separation between the 
realms of ‘economy’ and ‘society’ and a refusal to understand capital as a set of social 
relations of production. In that context, the concept of social capital is used to recapture the 
social and cultural component that had been previously conceptually expelled from 
capitalism, but was always there. The idea of social capital, on the one hand, adds to the 
reification and fragmentation of the concept of capital (that is, natural, production, human, 
social) and obscures our ability to understand our present day political economic reality in 
terms of connected social relations. On the other hand, as an ideological concept, it points to 
the direct value of social relations and moral obligation for the purposes of capital 
accumulation. 
Reciprocity is a concept almost as vague and undefined as social capital, and it is also 
politically charged (Narotzky 2007). It has a particular history in the social sciences that 
derives, originally, from Enlightenment views of the social and political community as a pact 
between individuals. Subsequently it has been somewhat elaborated by anthropologists 
seeking to explain patterns of resource circulation and social cohesion in non-capitalist 
societies.9  
The concept of reciprocity has been central to anthropological analyses of social 
interaction for a long time (e.g. Mauss 2002a; Polanyi 1957; Sahlins 1965; Malinowski 1961, 
1971; Weiner 1992; Godelier 1996), and has been revived recently as a sociological concept 
with an ‘alternative economy’ political agenda through the writings of the Mouvement 
Anticapitaliste en Sciences Sociales (MAUSS) group (Godbout 1992; Caillé 2007). The 
concept describes and seeks to explain transfers that are embedded in social and cultural 
domains. Cultural values defining moral obligation are crucial to the production of the 
relationships that support these transfers. In the realm of the economy, reciprocity refers to 
exchanges taking place within decision-making processes other than those guided by market 
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logic (that is, gift, charity, solidarity, mutual help, filial care). Reciprocal transfers are 
supported by previously existing social bonds that they in turn strengthen (Sahlins 1965; 
Gregory 1982). In the realm of politics, reciprocity refers to relations of mutual obligation 
that are supported by conceptions of justice and injustice, and moral imperatives (Hobsbawm 
1965; Thompson 1971; Scott 1976, 1985; Moore 1978; Bourdieu 1980a). In most societies, 
transfers of resources and sentiments of mutual obligation (legal, customary, moral) depend 
on multiple and different logics (material accumulation, prestige increase, religious duty, 
kinship obligations, love) that contribute to simultaneously reproducing a particular system of 
domination. 
For Gudeman (2001), reciprocity occurs at the boundaries of communities and 
between communities. It is a means for ‘extending the base’ by creating commensurable 
value out of the incommensurable value that is shared by the members of a community, and 
produces the ‘base’ for reproducing the community. In this sense, reciprocity could be said to 
correspond to ‘binding’ social capital, while sharing the base corresponds to ‘bonding’ social 
capital (Woolcock 1998). Social scientists, however, have alerted us to an excessive 
optimism regarding the nature of reciprocity as invariably expressing a positive aspect of 
social relations. Indeed, the highly contested and extreme relativity of moral domains of 
reference that support these transfers are especially subject to unequal, exploitative and 
speculative social processes such as patronage, corruption and mafias, or to be interpreted as 
unjust by a part of society that holds different moral frameworks (Bourdieu 1980a; Bugra 
1998; Narotzky and Smith 2006). In my view, reciprocity does not represent a communitarian 
mode of beneficial social interaction found in small, closely knit locations or social 
environments such as local communities, neighbourhoods or ideologically bound 
communities. Rather, the concept expresses a particular dimension of social relationships that 
is found in any kind of society. What seems interesting in Gudeman’s perspective on 
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reciprocity is the tension between incommensurable and commensurable values as they 
emerge prior to, or unconnected to, commoditization, but always connected to exchange. This 
tension, however, might be the foundation that enables non-market regimes of value to be co-
opted by capital accumulation. 
Reciprocity has both a material aspect expressed in the actual transfers of political and 
economic resources that take place between people or groups, and a cultural aspect expressed 
in the discourses that support diverse morals of mutual obligation. From this perspective, it 
attempts to capture the ambivalence in the construction, legitimization and practice of mutual 
obligation and responsibility in economic and political terms. It seeks to unpack social 
relations located simultaneously in market and non-market circuits of provisioning, in 
universal and particularistic modes of claiming, and between beneficial and predatory 
outcomes of redistribution processes. 
Reciprocity, however, is also the concept that describes the personal and concrete 
quality of social relationships that build up into social capital in Putnam’s view (Narotzky 
2009). While economists and sociologists trying to use a (post-Washington Consensus) social 
capital approach to development policies have tried to measure discrete elements of these 
useful social relationships, they have admitted to the inadequacy of the results, explicitly 
pointing at the qualitative and embedded nature of most of the elements under scrutiny. Their 
inability to fully approach these ‘other’ forms of regulation and obligation that sustain 
material transfers stems from a flawed methodological proposition: that social relationships 
can be cut into discrete pieces, and their concrete qualities described as measurable categories 
subject to aggregation and disaggregation. That is, it stems from positing that social 
relationships can be treated as ‘things’.10 Instead, a concept of reciprocity, in contrast to 
social capital, expresses an irresolvable entanglement of social values and material interests 
that need to be addressed in their ambivalence and tension.11 
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The concept of reciprocity seems to address exchange from a moral economy 
perspective. However, for our purposes we need to link the concept of reciprocity to a 
political economy framework while retaining its moral economy aspects. From this 
perspective, several questions emerge: How do we analyse social relations that sustain flows 
of transfers (of goods, information, services) that become incorporated in the value of 
commodities but are not commoditized in market exchange?12 How are these ‘other’ 
relationships incorporated in capitalist relations while at the same time being reproduced as 
something different,13 more primordial and emotional than contract or market relationships? 
Are all present-day social relations subsumed in a capitalist global structure of articulations 
and dependencies? Should we think of them as distinct from or, on the contrary, as a 
fundamental part of the social reproduction of capitalist accumulation? Would reciprocity be 
better than social capital for the understanding of how mutual obligation is produced and 
sustained between individuals, groups and institutions while giving us an insight into how it 
serves surplus value extraction? Would it help us make theoretical sense of the often 
ambivalent evaluation that ordinary people make of the social relations they depend on for 
obtaining a livelihood? What I find most appealing in the reciprocity concept is its 
underscoring of a generalized system of mutual dependencies and obligations that contribute 
to forms of collective social belonging. However, as these get thoroughly subsumed under 
capitalist imperatives, we might find that the social capital concept is a better description of 
what is taking place. 
 
A>Two Ethnographic Vignettes 
I will now present two ethnographic vignettes from different field sites. The first will 
consider the ‘payoff’ of care giving in a rural setting in Catalonia, where love and interest are 
the two sides of a morality of domestic social reproduction and petty commodity production 
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facilitated by land inheritance and access to family labour. This case shows how the 
entanglement of moral obligation and value production change with the demands of an 
increasingly liberalized market and the pressure for competition. 
The second vignette will consider the ‘traffic’ of favour networks in an informal semi-
rural regional economy where providing work in a context of high unemployment is 
perceived simultaneously as a gift of support, as a market transaction or as a form of 
exploitation by the subjects involved in the relationship.  
In both cases, flexible capitalism is based not only on the opportunistic use of existing 
reciprocal relations and moral obligations for the purpose of capital accumulation, but on 
their transformation into a new kind of ambivalent reality. 
 
B>The Payoff of Love 
The area where I did fieldwork in the mid 1980s is the comarca of Les Garrigues in the 
interior of Catalonia. This is a dry-land farming area specializing in olive oil production. 
Small and medium landownership (5 to 20 hectares) is the main form of access to land, and 
property enables membership in the processing cooperative producing olive oil for export.14 
Relations to the means of production within the family farm household (casa) show strong 
differentiation even as the cultural concept of casa stresses the common objective of all 
members of the household toward the collective family farm project.15 In the 1980s, the 
pressure of entry into the European Economic Community (Spain joined the EEC in 1986) 
forced investment to be made in the agricultural means of oil production and transformed 
social relations of production in order to increase productivity and enhance quality. 
Traditionally, the collective productive and reproductive endeavour of household 
members was not based on a naturalization of mutual obligations: casa members were bound 
by contract, often a notarized document.16 Therefore, they explicitly set in commensurable 
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terms the value of their various activities, some of which are strongly entangled with affects. 
The institution of marriage contracts in this area expressed access to the means of production: 
it explicitly set material returns for labour invested in the casa project, including the loving 
care of elderly parents. Although few casas drew up marriage contracts after the 1950s, every 
household with some landed property (over 90 per cent of the total) referred to it as the local 
framework of moral obligation.  
The heir’s marriage contract served to re-establish privately and explicitly the cultural 
assumption of a community of interest and casa identity as the basis of social reproduction.17 
Simultaneously, it created lines of differentiation between generations (predecessors versus. 
successors in ownership), between siblings (heir versus non-heirs) and between genders 
(male and female spouse obligations, and male preference in inheritance). These lines 
constructed specific power relations and revealed intra-household differentiation embedded 
in the meanings of such words as work, care and love: they defined what ‘working for the 
casa’ meant for different household members, and what they would get for it.18 Within this 
framework, support networks were developed, often full with tension and contradictory 
objectives and meanings, especially when urbanized, nuclear-family-centred, domestic moral 
economies become hegemonic in the late twentieth century as the competitive injunctions of 
the EEC came into play. Institutionalized modes of defining economic responsibilities and 
exchanges between household members (through customary law) and of producing the casa 
as an economic unit (a family farm) are increasingly overlapped by non-institutionalized 
modes of defining filial responsibilities (through affects and flexible moral obligations) and 
by technical modes of organizing the agricultural business. 
Still, recent informal support and care practices must be understood against the 
background of the institutionalized process of past marriage contracts (Narotzky 1991). The 
commitment to reproduce the casa, constrains the younger couple into dependent, sometimes 
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exploitive relations with an older couple in exchange for a sharecropping income and other 
resources such as shelter, babysitting or food-produce donations. Care of the elderly 
predecessor couple is, in the end, the factor determining the transfer of property assets to the 
next generation, and is the responsibility of the woman of the younger couple. This creates 
opportunities for non-inheriting siblings that take care of propertied elders without direct 
heirs. As time goes by, the priorities of the elderly couple change with care work becoming 
increasingly important as compared to farm labour.  The power balance between younger and 
older couple, and between genders in the younger couple is thus transformed. Property 
ownership is the definitive sanction of the transfer of control between generations, and the 
transfer is not completed until the older couple both die.19 Property transfer is also the proof 
of ‘love’ coming from the older couple, and reciprocates the caring ‘love’ given by the 
younger couple. The marriage ‘love’ bond between the younger couple presents the young 
woman’s care work as a joint endeavour and glosses over her exploitation as a care giver, 
especially when she is not the daughter and will not inherit. The casa will benefit from her 
work as a care giver which will be acknowledged as a contribution to that collective aim.20 
The picture that is drawn here is one where support provided in the language of love 
and moral obligation consolidates claims on material resources that are conceived of as part 
of entrepreneurial assets oriented toward the capitalist viability of the farm, while 
maintaining a family centred reproduction priority. 
In the mid 1980s, the effort to make farms viable and competitive before entry into 
the EEC pushed women into informal garment production networks, producing for such 
international brands as Benetton, which provided additional income for the household. 
Capitalization of the farm was supported by work that relied heavily on personalized social 
networks. This work went mostly unaccounted for in terms of the moral framework of the 
casa project. In contrast to the traditional institutionalized care work of household women 
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that provided access to farm assets, income from garment work was viewed as individual and 
aimed at personal consumption, and the term used for it was the morally tainted malgastos, 
literally ‘bad expenses’. But women used this personal income for family and household 
expenses (food, clothing, minor repairs) that had previously been covered by agricultural 
income.21 This practice freed farm income from being used for household reproduction and 
transformed it into capital for investment in the agricultural business. Love and care for the 
family channelled women’s personal income into ‘working for the casa’ without properly 
being acknowledged doing so (Narotzky 1990). The embeddedness of women’s moral 
commitment to the casa became the reason for their work in informal garment manufacture. 
Their labour was simultaneously incorporated and exploited in the agricultural and the 
garment commodity chains of capital accumulation, while their aim was to ‘work for the 
casa’.  
 
B>The Traffic of Favours  
The fieldwork for the following vignette was carried out by Gavin Smith and myself during 
1995/6 in the Vega Baja, a region in the autonomous community of Valencia. This is a 
predominantly shoe-manufacturing area with over 40 per cent footwear production in the 
informal sector and declining agricultural production of citrus and other garden produce for 
export (Bernabé 1975; Ybarra 1991; Ybarra et al. 2004; Narotzky and Smith 2006; Narotzky 
2009). The structure of production is fragmented and decentralized, and it relies heavily on 
family, kin and neighbourhood networks that alternatively provide access to income and 
labour. This takes a form resembling the Italian ‘industrial districts’, although with a clear 
hierarchical subcontracting articulation nested in networks of personalized relations centred 
on large commercial firms that often only retain marketing and packaging processes (Sabel 
1989; Ybarra 1991; Becattini 1994; Ybarra et al. 2004). The traffic of favours is ubiquitous 
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and permeates the entire social fabric. Here I wish to highlight the tensions that arise when 
feelings of shared belonging, structured by values and obligations (kinship, friendship, other 
forms of mutuality) that are not referred to in terms of the market become crucial to the 
organization of production in a very competitive global footwear market. Here, the 
experience of work is deeply embedded in other social relations and regimes of value that are 
distinct from market values. What happens, then, when labour and capital relations forgo 
‘contracts’ and, instead, rely heavily on the personal attributes and social circumstances of 
workers, middlemen and sweatshop owners? What happens when different regimes of value 
overlap in such a way that a pervasive ambiguity seems to be the basis of the local structuring 
of production? The situation in this case seems to mirror that of the previous case: instead of 
drawing up a contract of relations of production supported by affective ties (rendering 
commensurable the incommensurable), here theoretically contractual ties – such as the wage 
relation part of the labour market – eschew contracts and are substituted by personalized ties 
(rendering incommensurable the commensurable). 
For the small shoe-manufacturing entrepreneur or middleman in the Vega Baja, 
subject to the demands and tensions of a highly competitive global market, the use of 
affective relations for the construction of production relations is a necessity. Their claim over 
other people’s work are based on shared notions of belonging and mutual responsibility that 
refer to non-market domains (family, neighbourhood, friendship) and are morally qualified 
(Narotzky 2004). However, these claims occur in a context where the hegemonic model for 
labour relations is the contractual model of the free labour market. This ambiguous situation 
generates strong tensions and anxiety, both in the realm of the organization of the labour 
process as well as in the realm of affective relations and the structuring of personal and 
collective responsibilities. Deep tensions are generated or aggravated by the present-day 
embeddedness of production relations in the social fabric of the community, the family and 
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the self. These tensions arise from conflicting obligations towards those around whom 
personal and collective identities are constructed and security against uncertainty is 
intimately built. Conflicting responsibilities are experienced as part of a unique morality with 
two clearly differentiated and potentially contradictory aspects: firstly, economic interest; and 
second, care responsibilities. Both aspects are experienced as simultaneously part of the 
substance that builds proximity relations between kin, neighbours and friends, but the danger 
of their incompatibility is always lurking and emotionally stressful (Narotzky 2006). The 
moral aspect of the obligation both supports and contradicts exchange relations and 
exploitation. The permanent articulation of these split responsibilities is similar to that 
described for patronage moral economies and clientelist systems of power. This is often 
rendered in the language of ‘favours’, where people situated in very different social and 
economic positions try to make sense of the moral obligations that frame responsibility (Wolf 
1966).  
 
A>Ambiguous Responsibilities between Care and Profit 
The two cases sketched above bring out different articulations of economy and morality. The 
first case exposes the entanglement of different levels and meanings of provisioning, linking 
love and care to the material devolution of property and production work for the farm. It 
shows how domains of morality, exchange and power overlap in the social reproduction of 
the family farm, where the moral obligation to give care secures the right to property, and 
where positioning in regard to property legitimates power cleavages and exploitative relations 
in agriculture within the casa. The situation has changed in the context of growing 
involvement by local family farms in competitive global markets that demand increased 
investment, shifting family income to capital. This in turn has led to a diversification of 
income provisioning strategies, such as informal garment manufacture. As a result, the 
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clearly defined obligations of past marriage contracts (moral obligations sanctioned by law) 
have become blurred. In local discourse, the reproduction of the casa is still acknowledged as 
the most important objective of all household members. However, the idiom of value has 
shifted almost unnoticed from the kinship-oriented reproduction of the casa to a market-
oriented idea of the farm’s viability in market (money-making) terms.22 In the context of the 
farm as a market enterprise that has to produce an income for the family and reproduce or 
accumulate capital in order to ensure viability in market terms through investment, two 
complementary sets of responsibilities emerge as indissolubly tied, one that addresses the 
creation of profit, the other that of family income and care (Narotzky 1990). But the two 
contexts have fuzzy boundaries in practice: care has to be given for capital assets to be 
transferred, and farm viability needs to be maintained for family income to enable urbanized 
forms of consumption. Simultaneously, women’s personal income from wages needs to be 
lovingly devoted to domestic consumption in order to enable capitalization of the farm and its 
viability. 
The overlapping of these different domains of value seems central to the creation and 
appropriation of surplus value both in agriculture and the garment industry. Stephen 
Gudeman speaks of ‘debasement’ when the ‘base’ of community reproduction is co-opted by 
the ‘market’. He defines this process as one where ‘joining the un-priced and the priced, or 
community resources, labor and relationships, with capital, can lead to debasement’ 
(Gudeman 2001: 126). The Catalan farmers’ case that I have just described could be 
interpreted as ‘debasement’ (ibid.: 121-143), where shifts between different value regimes 
effect a conversion of value that is appropriated by and accumulates in the market realm (the 
incommensurable ‘base’ being dispossessed by the commensurable ‘market’). It seems to me, 
however, that these differentiated ‘regimes’ appear as the consequence of our categories of 
analysis, but are not relevant in practice to real subjects. Instead, what seems to be relevant 
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for practice is the ambiguity that we can capture in the ‘love’ idiom that links care, moral 
obligation and material transfers, which are central to involvement in the market by farmer 
entrepreneurs and to the provisioning of cheap and docile labour in garment manufacture. 
Base and market appear as two faces of the same coin, and ambiguity becomes the stuff of 
social practice: we seem to be closer to Gudeman’s concept of reciprocity, which 
incorporates the tension between incommensurable and commensurable values in exchange. 
Here, the social value of exchange structures and takes precedence as the argument for social 
organization: working/caring for the casa.  
The second case study would seem to involve a much clearer case of ‘debasement’. 
However, I would like to address these ambiguous categories directly instead of thinking in 
terms of different value regimes (gift and commodity) or distinct domains of the economy 
(base and market). Indeed, what seems to be happening in the Vega Baja’s decentralized and 
heavily informal footwear production industry is that social actors cannot easily separate their 
everyday practices into distinct value regimes. Thus my contention is that this overlapping of 
value regimes is precisely what enables a particular form of exploitation by capitalist firms. 
The blurring of value boundaries also produces a particular mode of governmentality that 
shifts conflict locations and obscures knowledge about the localized and globalized processes 
of capital accumulation. In the present conjuncture it might be useful to think about a regime 
of value constituted by both incommensurable and commensurable kinds of value, with 
personalized, affective, moral obligations and rational, contractual ones operating 
simultaneously. Reciprocity turns into social capital as an asset for accumulation. The moral 
economy arena is losing the sharp boundaries that seemed to differentiate a non- or pre-
capitalist ‘moral economy’ based on reciprocity from the ‘political economy’ of capitalism 
based on free contractual exchange relations.23 Rather than a process of ‘conversion’ between 
distinct value domains, as Gudeman proposes, we might be witnessing a process of value 
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creation within an ambiguous value regime that enables accumulation in present-day 
capitalism, and simultaneously the reproduction of social and identity values through 
commodity consumption.24 If the central tenet of the Marxist labour theory of value is the 
dual nature of labour in the commodity – the form of exchange value and the real use value 
content – then the unity of opposites of this dual reality results in a situation whereby, ‘the 
transaction between the capitalist and the worker is as much an exchange of equivalents as of 
non-equivalents’ (Grossman 1977: 36). In the case of the Vega Baja, mystification directly 
addresses the ‘form’ of exchange: the form of relations between capital and labour is that of 
non-equivalent, personalized, localized and unique reciprocity ties, but it is simultaneously 
that of a commoditized, labour-market exchange equivalent. Here the ‘exchange of 
equivalents’ aspect of the commodity of labour power is in turn mystified by a non-
commoditized form (social capital). The content remains its use value capacity to produce 
concrete goods (see also Knox, this volume). 
In the present conjuncture, forms of market value extraction seem to increasingly 
favour a fully embedded labour force, one whose economic alienation is predicated on its 
linkage to other forms of reciprocal obligation and value regimes (in fact, to its non-
alienation). It is often embedded in such a way that ‘love labour’ and wage labour are 
impossible to separate, different moralities are not easy to distinguish, and the tensions of the 
constant overlapping of value realms produces useful forms of cooperation but often also 
acute distress (see also Cross, Garsten, this volume). It is also embedded in such a way that 
capitalist firms directly or indirectly rely on the growing ambiguity of the relation between 
capital and labour to extract surplus value. Keane has described the ambiguity involved in 
exchange processes as a result of semiotic volatility and the temporal dimension of most 
exchange processes where ‘the boundaries among regimes of value are always vulnerable to 
slippage and retrospective re-categorization’ through the mediating role of metalanguages of 
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action, reflexively characterizing and disciplining systems of exchange (Keane 2008: 33).25 
This is an insightful perspective on the variability of value regimes, but it rests on the 
assumption that actors operate shifts between set categories of value regimes that can be 
discursively defined and are often discrete. Instead, I propose that present-day values are 
increasingly ambiguous as categories and ambivalent as moral guides for action, but seem to 
have become central in the discourse of capitalism and in its practice. 
 
A>Conclusion 
The argument I want to make is about a shift in perspective away from conceiving distinct, 
confronted regimes of value producing antagonistic forms of moral obligation that would 
guide practice according to dissimilar categories of good or bad, clearly apparent to the social 
actors concerned and potentially producing struggles over value. Rather, I suggest we listen 
to the anxiety of the subjects in our ethnographic experience and to their inability to define 
their actions in terms of stable categories and moral options regarding their economic 
practices. The entanglement of care and profit values might not be a novelty, as our Catalan 
farmers know from their past moral economy of the casa and the reciprocal obligations of 
‘working for the casa’. But care and profit then appeared as complementary aspects of a 
coherent morality centred on the household as a social entity and identity to be reproduced.26 
It was a household moral economy, instituted in customary law, that created its own 
anxieties, but was unambiguous as to its objectives and obligations. In present-day farming 
households, this clarity is disappearing as market capitalization obligations compete with 
family reproduction obligations (and individual consumption becomes the main driving force 
of younger generations) within the apparently stable and coherent idiom of the casa project. 
For the footwear manufacturers of the Vega Baja, the informal structure of production 
and subcontracting that replaced large Fordist factories in the late 1970s has strongly re-
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embedded production relations in personal networks of reciprocity, in turn embedded in 
market-oriented objectives. Sabel (1991) has described this as a Möbius strip-like situation, 
where different value regimes form the obverse and reverse sides of an undistinguishable 
continuum.  
We must now ask what characterizes this new ambiguous value regime. First, 
uncertainty: the semiotic volatility described by Keane has materialized in Sabel’s Möbius 
strip-like framework. As a consequence, the reconfiguration of actions according to different 
idioms is not so much an instrumental discursive shift that develops in time; for many, it is a 
permanent ambiguous reality producing anxiety, while for others it remains mostly an 
opportunistic arena where this ambiguous value regime becomes an instrument of 
exploitation within a clearly defined market value orientation.  
Second, class demobilization: it is increasingly difficult to understand market 
imperatives as different from livelihood ones, so that the entrepreneurial self appears as the 
universal identity model (see Garsten, this volume). It is increasingly difficult to experience 
commonality in the practices of exploitation and dispossession, as every individual takes 
responsibility for their social position and sees it as crucially embedded in their personal 
assets, now transformed into ‘capital’ assets (‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’ being 
classical examples). The collapsing of a ‘household morality’ into ‘capitalist morality’, two 
realms of value that had initially been carved out as different with the rise of industrial 
capitalism during the nineteenth century,27 impedes the production of spaces of autonomy, 
convergence and dissent around moral values such as ‘respect’ or ‘responsibility’ not directed 
by money-making objectives (Sennett and Cobb 1972; Rancière 1981).28 Following De 
Angelis (2007), it is worth keeping in mind the discursive and practical production of distinct 
regimes of value in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the outcome of a value 
struggle. However, the situation I am describing seems to be one of value collusion, which is 
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different from that of social movements that attempt to create values distinct from capitalist-
driven ones through value struggle.  
Here I want to make a brief excursus around the value concept as differently framed 
by moral economy and political economy approaches. From a political economy point of 
view, value is inextricably linked with the commoditized aspect of social reproduction 
through the production and exchange of the commodities that are needed to sustain life. The 
double aspect of value (use value and exchange value) emerges as a consequence of this, and 
the simultaneous exchange of equivalents and non-equivalents gives rise to the Marxist 
labour theory of value. Thus value is a fundamentally contradictory dimension that human 
relations adopt in capitalism. Worth is what accrues as profit individually and socially from 
this fundamental contradiction. From a moral economy viewpoint, value relates to 
responsibility and mutual obligation in a social and cultural environment that appears as 
coherent, albeit unequal. Worth comes from seamless compliance to formally instituted or 
tacit norms that contrive to ensure social reproduction. In the classic moral economy 
approach (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976) and the newer version of value struggles (De Angelis 
2007), what is analysed is the clash between these two modes of measuring value in 
particular historical conjunctures of primitive accumulation or the expansion of enclosure.29 
In my hypothesis, present-day capitalism rests on a new moral hegemony based on the 
blurring of value regimes that were previously clearly defined and instituted.30 If, as Marx 
and Engels envisioned it, the ‘constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones’ (2010:16), we might be witnessing one of these 
revolutions in the Möbius strip-like compression of value regimes that increasingly pervades 
social relations of and in production, and guides the reproduction of the system. The 
uncertainty and anxiety that is thus produced in ordinary people becomes a powerful 
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ideological means of domination for economic and political elites. Marxist political economy 
understood that the exchange value of labour power realized in the market obscured the 
concrete aspect it had as a use value able to incorporate concrete value into commodities and 
produce surplus value through exchange. An important part of the concrete aspect of labour 
power stems from the various moral obligations set by a historically produced cultural and 
social reality. This is used as an asset by capitalist firms both large and small in a global 
conjuncture. As a result, the equalizing aspect of the market exchange form of labour power 
is obscured with the underscoring of its extremely particularized assets. Present-day 
capitalism destroys society not so much through disembedding the economy from other social 
relations and value realms, but rather through pervasively embedding capitalist objectives in 
all spheres of responsibility, blurring distinctions, inhibiting the emergence of alternative 
value spaces and preventing struggle – in fact, by turning reciprocity (a nineteenth-century 
concept) into social capital (a late-twentieth-century concept). 
In the Catalan farmers’ case, the casa moral economy is not devoid of contradiction 
and anxiety. It is strongly articulated with the money-making realm through labour and 
produce markets, farm investment needs and family and individual consumption patterns that 
express social position in a class-based society. Even so, value is strongly oriented toward 
family-casa reproduction rather than capital accumulation, although this is mediated by the 
competitive market. What the Vega Baja case seems to show more clearly perhaps is that 
capitalist relations of production often co-opt spaces and networks of intimate belonging 
directly for profit-making objectives, and entangle moralities of a very different sort in a 
unique practice of earning a livelihood. This situation should be compared to  the proto-
industrial entanglement of merchant capitalism and independent producer figures, which has 
generally been described as petty commodity production patterns of capitalist encroachment 
(or the articulation of different ‘modes of production’). If we free ourselves from the 
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‘transition’ model framework and look at these realities as paradoxical, non-rational, albeit 
reasonable aspects of capitalist production relations, we might be in a better position to 
analyse some of the mechanisms that sustain capitalist reproduction in the long term. 
Ambivalent value regimes and ambiguous categories increase the ability of both discretionary 
and arbitrary decision making by those in power. 
As the ambivalence of moral regimes grows, so does the totalitarian aspect of 
capitalist relations expand into the intimacy of the entrepreneurial self, closing spaces for 
thinking and acting according to other sets of obligations. This is closely related to a round of 
accumulation by dispossession, whereby enclosure attacks the most intimate boundaries of 
personal support and solidarity, and uses these relationships as assets in the market. As a 
result, non-equivalent exchange in the labour market gets incorporated into the surplus value 
extraction process in production. While this has been described and theorized at the ‘formal 
subsumption’ stage of capitalist development, I would suggest that it is central to present day 
flexible capitalism as well. Flexible capitalism appears to refer to a situation where ‘real 
subsumption’ often adopts the mystified form of personalized, reciprocity-based, non-
commoditized relations for the labour power commodity. This is a process of ‘paradoxical 
alienation’ where capitalist exploitation – the accumulation of surplus value – hinges on not 
fully commoditizing the labour force. 
Rather than presenting a totally new phase of capitalist accumulation, flexible 
capitalism can be described as ‘change within continuity’, a situation where some practices of 
entanglements and moral obligations that sustained work transfers and work organization 
(kinship, patronage, ritual, customary law and so on) in other circumstances (for example, 
merchant capitalism, proto-industrialization, Fordist capitalism) are transformed into 
something similar yet different in present-day globalized free-trade capitalism. The tension 
between the concepts of reciprocity and social capital as they can be used to describe the 
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present-day situation of flexible capitalism seems to capture both the ambiguity of the value 
of social relations in exchange and the ambivalence surrounding the final objective of 
exchange. 
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A>Notes
                                                 
1 Although some authors have proposed an extension of the concept to other domains of life 
(e.g. Fassin 2009), stressing the moral in the ‘moral economy’ concept and adopting a very 
general understanding of ‘economy’, I think that the particular force of the concept rests in 
the articulation of moral values and obligations with material provisioning and resource 
allocation. 
2 In the Marxist tradition, concepts such as ‘formal subsumption’ and ‘articulation of modes 
of production’ are examples of this difficulty; in the neo-classical tradition, ‘modernization’ 
and ‘underdevelopment’ are also attempts to address this difficulty; more recently the 
concepts of ‘informal economy’ and ‘social capital’ also tackle the issue.  
3 In Gramsci’s terms, the ‘historical bloc’ refers to the articulation of material realities and 
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ideological constructs. He stresses the need for organic intellectuals to produce knowledge 
that corresponds to the actual feelings of the ‘popular element’ and to the material structure 
they live in. The historical bloc thus formed can then become a force of change (Gramsci 
1987: 360, 366, 377, 418): ‘If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation … is 
provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence 
knowledge … then and only then is the relationship one of representation. Only then … can 
the shared life be realised which alone is a social force – with the creation of the “historical 
bloc”’ (ibid.: 418). 
4 For expressions of this tension, see both Garsten and Knox (this volume). 
5 The concept is defined as ‘the ensemble of actual or potential resources that are tied to the 
possession of a durable web of relationships, more or less institutionalized, of inter-
acquaintance and inter-acknowledgement’ (Bourdieu 1980b: 2). 
6 See the Social Capital Initiative at the World Bank 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/E
XTTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20194767~isCURL:Y~menuPK:401035~pagePK:1
48956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html , accessed May 4th 2010. For a critique, see 
Fine (2001). 
7 ‘In all societies, to summarize our argument so far, dilemmas of collective action hamper 
attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether in politics or in economics. Third-party 
enforcement is an inadequate solution to this problem. Voluntary cooperation (like rotating 
credit associations) depends on social capital. Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks 
of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to 
defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation. Trust itself is an 
emergent property of the social system, as much as a personal attribute. Individuals are able 
to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and networks within 
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which their actions are embedded’ (Putnam 1993: 177). For a critique of the perverse effects 
of the application of the social capital concept in the development programmes of 
international agencies, see Bretón (2005). 
8 For a critique, see Greco (1996), Bologna (1997), Supiot (2000) and Bretón (2005). 
9 It is interesting to note, however, that the concept of reciprocity is ambivalent from the 
start. First, it relates to ‘organic solidarity’ (Durkheim), that is, to heterogeneous societies 
(sociétés polysegmentaires, or complex societies) and explicit norms and obligations, while, 
second, it is assumed as the main characteristic of ‘primitive’ closely knit societies, of 
communities sharing a ‘base’ homogeneously glued by ‘culture’ (Durkheim 2008); but see 
Mauss (2002b) for an early critique. 
10 See Knox (this volume ) for the case of skill. 
11 It is interesting to note in this respect that Lévi-Strauss’s reading of Mauss was 
particularly harmful to the idea of reciprocity as developed in the latter’s essay on the gift. 
Mauss’s proposition (one that has been subsequently recaptured by many Melanesianists, e.g. 
Weiner 1992) is tied to his idea of the ‘total prestation’ – that is, to a mode of social 
interaction where people and things are not detached from each other a priori, often are never 
fully detached even when changing hands in circulation, and where the movement of objects 
participates simultaneously in different value regimes in the society as well as being key to 
the social reproduction of the total structure. In Lévi-Strauss’s reading, there is instead an 
‘exchange’ which means that individuals or groups are detached from the things they give to 
each other, and that it is the action of giving and taking things that produces social cohesion 
(Lévi-Strauss 1989). 
12 This debate brings to mind the domestic labour debate of the 1970s, which attempted to 
understand how domestic housework was incorporated as value through the commodity of 
labour power (Dalla Costa and James 1972). 
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13 This brings to mind Harvey’s idea of the centrality of the process of accumulation by 
dispossession in capitalism, and how an ‘outside’ has to be produced and reproduced in order 
to keep the process of accumulation going (Harvey 2005). 
14 During the nineteenth century, however, large numbers of day labourers (up to 50 per 
cent) and a substantial number of sharecroppers constituted the productive structure, although 
the size of properties was on average similar. Private oil mills were then the only means 
available for transforming the crop into oil and, patronage relations with large land- and oil-
mill owners were pervasive. 
15 The same concept – casa – is used by Catalan political representatives as a metaphor of 
the nation, building on a nineteenth-century corporatist and Catholic understanding of the 
social body, but simultaneously based on the contractual tradition of the Catalan customary 
law of medieval origin (Terradas 1984; Prat 1989). 
16 This system of household production and impartible inheritance developed in relation to a 
particular emphyteutical organization of feudal production in this area of Catalonia (Terradas 
1984). Emphyteusis is a usufruct system whereby rights to land are hereditary held on a piece 
of land that is the property of another person. 
17 This identity includes all people originally belonging to a certain casa, even after founding 
another casa in the case of non-heirs. 
18 ‘Working for the casa’ is a formula found in all marriage contracts, and the central 
argument justifying transfers of property and services. 
19 As the death of the propertied parent approaches, a notarized donation inter vivos will 
probably transfer the main property assets to the younger couple, reserving use rights to both 
parents until their death, in order to make sure that they will receive proper care. 
20 A man in his late sixties told me the following about his father, who had died aged ninety: 
‘I loved my father very much and I respected him … But I never knew if he really loved me 
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until he died and left me all the property. I thought he didn’t love me because he had never 
demonstrated it, he had never said, “I will leave you everything”. But he did, and this proves 
that he loved me. I thought he didn’t love me, you understand, he never expressed it’. In a 
further elaboration of the intertwining of love, morality and material transfers of care and 
property, this man, whose wife had taken care assiduously of his father ‘until the last minute’, 
explained: ‘That person who takes care of you until death is the one who should get a 
compensation (recompensa) … The heir (hereu) has to care for his parents until the last 
minute, that is the reason why then the parents give the biggest share to the one who stays 
with them, who is good with them. Being good (portarse bien) means one should take care, 
and if the parent is sick [it means] to keep company and cook the food, to wash the clothes, to 
take care of the house – that is being good … The person who is with you in the house (casa), 
who has to clean you if you dirty yourself, has to clean the bed, do everything for you, feed 
you in the mouth and push the wheel chair. I suppose this is the one who should get the larger 
part’. 
21 For a similar case, see Neveling (this volume). 
22 I refer here to Gudeman’s concepts of the ‘base’ as oriented toward the reproduction of the 
community’s resources, and the ‘market’ as profit oriented (Gudeman 2001). Here the 
concept of petty commodity production used in the peasant studies literature might be 
particularly appropriate. 
23 Here I am using Hann’s definition of moral economy: ‘moral economy is primarily a 
nexus of beliefs, practices and emotions among the folk, rather than an analytical concept 
designed to register only those beliefs, practices and emotions which conduce to action which 
the observer considers to be progressive…’ (Hann 2010: 195). 
24 For buyer-driven commodity chains such as footwear, clothing and so on, Foster speaks of 
a ‘value chain’ that encompasses two poles of value creation, part of a unique process. He 
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points to branding in consumption processes, in the context of commodity chain structures of 
production as a form of value creation and accumulation that is based on the articulation of 
surplus value extraction in a classical labour–capital relationship, and a ‘work of love’ in 
consumption practices which also produces value that is extracted and accumulated by capital 
(Foster 2008: 20). A similar argument is made by Thrift about the centrality of ‘affects’ in the 
added value creation process (Thrift 2005) and in politics (Thrift 2004). 
25 Keane has argued that ‘the boundaries among regimes of value are always vulnerable to 
slippage and retrospective recategorization. This is due both to the semiotic ambiguity 
inherent in material things themselves, and in the temporal dimension of virtually any 
exchange that extends beyond barter for immediate use. Both the ambiguity and temporality 
provide openings for social intervention and individual opportunism. For instance, a loan that 
is never returned can become a ‘gift’ – or a ‘theft’. Goods given by one party in an ethos of 
generalized reciprocity (‘we never calculate among brothers’), if never reciprocated, may in 
time become subject to a bitter reckoning of accounts after all. An incomplete marriage 
exchange may register as the Maussian debt that creates solidarity among affines – or, in 
time, produce a shameful relation of subordination. If transactions are events, they are geared 
to exerting control over definitions and outcomes in the future, beyond the event. They thus 
contain within themselves metalanguages of action, that is, reflexive characterizations 
(explicit but more often implicit) of the kind of event now taking place, and the kinds of 
participants entering into it. Distinctions among regimes of value require indigenous forms of 
objectification and self-consciousness that tell people, for instance, “this now is a case of 
swapping, not selling”, and so forth’ (Keane 2008: 33).  
He adds: ‘It is, I want to suggest, in the very nature of social institutions and actions that the 
mediating role of semiotic forms in systems of exchange, of the metalanguages that discipline 
them, and thus of the social relations they continue to reflect and even reproduce, should play 
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a critical role even in the newest economic formations’ (ibid.: 36). 
26 People were known through the name of the casa they were born into, or by the name of 
the casa they married into. 
27 This was often conceived as a ‘natural economy’ or a ‘pre-capitalist economy’ by Marx, 
one that set the conditions of possibility for primitive accumulation through enclosure and 
formal subsumption. This carving out of clearly differentiated value regimes seems to be as 
much the result of confrontation and struggle between the powerful as the result of organic 
intellectuals’ strategies of defending spaces of autonomy (Humphries 1977; Reddy 1987).  
28 See also Humphries (1977) for labourers’ struggle to maintain a ‘separate’ space in the 
home). 
29 Enclosure is defined as ‘The action of surrounding or marking off (land) with a fence or 
boundary; the action of thus converting pieces of common land into private property.’ OED 
30 This can also provide a useful perspective on the related transformations of the liberal 
state into its present form of overlapping responsibilities, and its fuzzy – rational-emotional – 
justifications for regulation (devolution of responsibilities, overlapping of jurisdictions, legal 
pluralism and the cunning state). Cf. Randeria (2007). 
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